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Most people intuitively understand what it means to
“hear a tune in your head.” Converging evidence now
indicates that auditory cortical areas can be recruited
even in the absence of sound and that this corres-
ponds to the phenomenological experience of imag-
ining music. We discuss these findings as well as
some methodological challenges. We also consider
the role of core versus belt areas in musical imagery,
the relation between auditory and motor systems dur-
ing imagery of music performance, and practical im-
plications of this research.
Cognitive neuroscientists are faced with a seemingly
daunting task: understanding how the brain enables us
to experience our rich inner world of thoughts, feelings,
and images. The subjectivity involved in these internal
processes provides a particular challenge because sci-
entific methods require one to measure verifiable, ob-
servable events. One domain in which this problem has
played out is mental imagery. Although behaviorists in
their heyday insisted that imagery was off limits be-
cause of its obscure, subjective nature, clever cogni-
tivists demonstrated early on that reliable behavioral
measures could be obtained that served as indices of
what was going on inside the mind. Shepard’s classic
demonstration of mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler,
1971) serves as an excellent example of how an overt
measurement (response time to judge the orientation
of a letter) can provide evidence of a covert mental pro-
cess. In other words, one infers the existence of a pro-
cess based on observing some effect caused by that
process; in this respect, cognitive approaches are not
so different from physics or other sciences in which the
objects of study (neutrinos, black holes, or whatever)
are simply not accessible.
Recent Advances in the Study of Musical Imagery
Imagery is not exclusively visual, as anyone can attest
to who has ever been annoyed by some advertising jin-
gle playing relentlessly in his or her mind. On a more
exalted level, composers such as Beethoven or Smet-
ana, who became deaf later in their lives, nonetheless
were able to compose magnificent music, presumably
because they were able to conjure up musical images
solely internally. Many researchers have concentrated
on understanding musical imagery in particular partly
because of the ubiquity and vividness of imagined mu-
sic. So what enables us to produce these “mental con-*Correspondence: robert.zatorre@mcgill.cacerts”? What are the psychological and neural mecha-
nisms associated with these processes?
A handful of studies have now been carried out on
this topic using a variety of techniques, including, mag-
neto-encephalography (Schürmann et al., 2002), posi-
tron emission tomography (Halpern and Zatorre, 1999;
Zatorre et al., 1996), and functional MRI (Halpern et al.,
2004; Kraemer et al., 2005; Yoo et al., 2001), as well
as behavioral lesion measures (Zatorre and Halpern,
1993), which provide better evidence of causality than
do functional measures. These diverse studies con-
verge on one principal finding: that neural activity in
auditory cortex can occur in the absence of sound (Fig-
ure 1) and that this activity likely mediates the phe-
nomenological experience of imagining music. Beyond
this basic understanding, however, much remains to be
understood, including the relative contributions of pri-
mary versus secondary auditory regions in each hemi-
sphere, the participation of the frontal cortex to the im-
agery process, and the role of musical training in
development of musical imagery. Before discussing
these substantive questions, however, we turn our at-
tention briefly to methodological issues.
Methodological Problems and Solutions
The problem of measuring internal phenomena might
appear to have finally found a solution with functional
imaging techniques, since one can observe the un-
derlying neural activity more directly, rather than infer-
ring its presence. Yet, we are still left with the concep-
tual problem of knowing what is being measured. Thus,
merely placing subjects in a scanner and asking them
to imagine some music, for instance, simply will not
do, because one will have no evidence that the desired
mental activity was actually taking place. Neural activ-
ity can still be measured under these circumstances,
but it may well be related to other processes than the
one intended. One good solution to this problem in-
volves behavioral indices, such that an overt response
is measured that either depends on or correlates with
the imagined event. For instance, if we ask people to
imagine the first four notes of Beethoven’s Fifth Sym-
phony and they correctly and consistently judge that
the fourth note is lower than the third, then we have
objective evidence that an internal representation con-
taining pitch information has been accessed (Halpern,
1988). In the context of neuroimaging, such tasks have
the disadvantage that they carry a lot of cognitive over-
head in the form of attentional, working memory, and
response demands; but these can be accounted for
with appropriate control conditions. Simpler tasks, such
as imagining the continuation of a known musical se-
lection (Kraemer et al., 2005) can also be useful. But in
such tasks there is less control over the success with
which imagery may be achieved at any given moment,
absent a behavioral correlate, such as the time taken
for the continuation, matched against the length of the
excerpt. Using fMRI poses special problems because
of the loud acoustical artifact produced by echo-planar
imaging, which itself results in a large auditory cortical
response. The interactions between this response and
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10cthe one related to the formation of auditory imagery
fmakes interpretation difficult, particularly when the
themodynamic response functions between imagined
cand perceived events overlap (Kraemer et al., 2005).
iThis problem can be mitigated, however, by using
gsparse sampling or other noise abatement strategies.
iWhat Role Does Auditory Cortex Play in Imagery?
tDespite these technical difficulties, most imagery stud-
Zies have indeed succeeded in demonstrating that the
sauditory cortex responds even in the absence of sound
mand that this response tends to co-occur with sub-
njective reports of imagining music. But does the pri-
g
mary, or core auditory cortex, participate in musical im-
f
agery? A similar question exists in the field of visual
t
imagery, but there is now substantial evidence that pri-
f
mary visual cortex can be recruited by certain tasks p
(Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003). The literature in musi- f
cal imagery to date is still uncertain on this point. Most t
prior studies do agree that activation in secondary, or t
belt, auditory cortex is reliably found (Figure 1). Al- i
though some authors have reported activation in pri- A
mary cortex, the precise location of core areas can be M
difficult to determine because of the intersubject vari- v
ability of these structures; furthermore, because of par- b
tial volume effects, what may appear to be activity in r
primary regions may actually represent spillover from b
adjacent nonprimary zones. The most critical variable, a
however, is likely to be the task demands, as they have c
proven to be in the visual domain. It is premature to n
anticipate what auditory imagery tasks might reliably i
elicit primary activation, given the very small number of a
studies carried out so far and the small subset of those n
that have even sought to verify the precise location of e
the activation. s
An additional point that many of these studies ad- p
dress concerns the lateralization of the response; once t
again, task demands and also the nature of the stimuli T
to be imagined likely play a role. For instance, bilateral f
activation has been observed when familiar songs with n
lyrics are used, most likely because there is imagery ofb
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Figure 1. Lateral View of Right Cerebral Hemisphere Illustrating L
Area of Hemodynamic Increase, in Color, during an Auditory Imag- o
ery Task
2
Although the task is performed in silence, activation is observed
awithin auditory cortex in the posterior aspect of the superior tem-
cporal gyrus. Data reanalyzed from Halpern et al., 2004.
c
soth the sung text and the musical component (Zatorre
t al., 1996). But when instrumental music is used
Halpern et al., 2004), the pattern tends to shift toward
ctivation in the right auditory cortex, in accord with the
mportant role of these structures in processing pitch
nformation (Zatorre et al., 2002). The recent study by
raemer et al. (2005) did show left auditory cortex acti-
ation even with nonverbal materials, but the degree of
ctivity on the right, if any, was not reported, leaving
his question still open.
Assuming we can agree that auditory cortical activity
nderlies the experience of imagery, the question still
emains, how does the auditory cortex become active
n the first place? The most likely explanation is that
op-down mechanisms are involved in reactivating neu-
al traces that are somehow encoded in sensory cortex.
ong ago, Penfield observed that electrical stimulation
f the exposed surface of sensory cortical areas (Figure
) could result in the patient reporting illusory visual or
uditory percepts (Penfield and Perot, 1963). The artifi-
ial electrical input from an electrode results in a hallu-
inatory rather than an imagery experience, but pre-
umably under normal circumstances there is a signal
oming from elsewhere that accesses the sensory in-
ormation in auditory cortex. It is most likely that in-
eractions between frontal cortical areas and auditory
ortex are the way that imagery is instantiated. There
s a tight anatomical connectivity between these re-
ions, and most studies that report whole-brain data
nvolving the generation of an auditory image find fron-
al cortex to be an important component (Halpern and
atorre, 1999). Thus, when one wants to conjure up a
ong in one’s mind, frontal-based retrieval mechanisms
ight be called upon; at the same time, feedback sig-
als from auditory cortex could be important in distin-
uishing between imagery and a real sound coming
rom the environment. Indeed, Griffiths (2000) proposed
hat a breakdown in this system might be responsible
or the musical hallucinations that he observed in peo-
le with acquired deafness. It is notable that this study
ound no evidence for primary auditory cortex activa-
ion, making suspect any argument linking primary cor-
ex activation with stronger phenomenology of imag-
ned sounds.
uditory versus Motor Imagery
otor imagery is the imagination of the kinesthetics in-
olved in actual movement and has been examined for
oth simple tapping sequences and complex musical
outines. One methodological challenge in examining
rain activations in motor imagery is to insure that no
ctual movements have occurred, which can be ac-
omplished via EMG monitoring. Motor imagery for
onauditory-associated movements sometimes results
n activation of M1 and often activates secondary motor
reas, such as SMA (Naito et al., 2002). Thus it should
ot be surprising that musicians can evoke motor imag-
ry for their instrument during imagined playing. For in-
tance, Langheim et al. (2002) asked string players to
lay or imagine playing a familiar piece; the times taken
o play and imagine the pieces were highly correlated.
hese authors found a number of areas to be active in
rontal lobes, cerebellum, parietal lobe, and SMA, but
ot M1 during imagined playing compared to rest.
In many musical situations, sound is associated with
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11Figure 2. Regions of the Exposed Cortical
Surface, Marked with Dots, which Resulted
in a Hallucinatory Experience of Hearing Mu-
sic Upon Electrical Stimulation
Modified from Penfield and Perot, 1963.movement. Instrumentalists make extensive arm, fin-
ger, and sometimes foot movements in the course of
producing their instrument’s voice. Singers use com-
plex movements of the vocal apparatus to produce
songs, especially if they are putting words to those
songs. Given the behavioral and neural evidence for
people being able to imagine musical movements, is
there evidence that auditory and motor imagery may be
integrated in the brain? Hickok et al. (2003) found that
area Spt (parietal-temporal boundary) responded to
both imagined auditory (both speech and music) and
covertly produced sequences in a similar fashion. In
perhaps a stronger test of this integration, Haueisen
and Knösche (2001) found that pianists showed activa-
tion in primary motor regions corresponding to the fin-
ger that would have produced a given note, even when
they were merely listening to pieces they knew how to
perform. Conversely, Haslinger et al. (2005) observed
activation in several auditory areas when musicians
watched a silent video of someone fingering piano
keys. Thus, despite a rather different circuitry, imagery
of related musical sounds and movement can be inte-
grated. This corresponds to reports from musicians
that they can “hear” their instrument during mental
practice.
Cross-Modal Interactions
Processing in one sensory modality can affect process-
ing in another, either by increasing or suppressing ac-
tivity; similar interactions also appear to occur if one or
both tasks are based not on perceptual, but on imag-
ined information. Langheim et al. (2002) found that
imagining musical performances suppressed activity in
the auditory regions, although they suggested that it
may have been related to suppression of scanner
noise. Halpern et al. (2004) also found that a visual im-
agery task suppressed activity in right secondary audi-
tory cortex (which was active in imagery for musical
timbre) to levels below that seen with a silent baseline.
As noise was not a factor given the sparse sampling
technique used, it seems that cross-modal interactions
may operate similarly in auditory imagery as they do in
the processing of actual sound.
Implications
Musical imagery is important to musicians, so an un-
derstanding of its neural basis may help us understand
aspects of expertise as well as provide some useful
information for music educators. For instance, brass,
wind, string players, and singers imagine the pitch of
an upcoming entrance to facilitate tuning. Conductors
and arrangers who study scores in silence also must
imagine pitches, as well as timbre, rhythm, and othermusical attributes. Highben and Palmer (2004) asked
pianists to learn an unfamiliar piece, under normal con-
ditions or when they could not hear their own playing.
Players who tested high on an aural skills battery were
least disturbed in learning the piece without auditory
feedback, suggesting that their auditory imagery skills
were adding in the necessary auditory experience
to facilitate learning. Humphreys (1986) reported that
training in auditory imagery improved harmony skills
in children.
The research described above can also help illumi-
nate how musicians use mental practice. This skill in-
volves imagery in several modalities: visual (pianists
“see” their hands on the keyboard), motor/kinesthetic
(they “feel” the keyboard and finger motions), as well as
auditory. Experimental evidence bearing on the neural
processes involved is still quite limited, but Pascual-
Leone (2003) has demonstrated that mental practice
improves performance, albeit not to the level of real
practice. However, changes over time in the size of the
cortical representation of the motor cortex were similar
for real and imagined practice. Given the existence of
cross-modal interactions, we may eventually be in a
better position to explain when and how these imag-
ined experiences will actually benefit musicians and
thus be able to optimize practice regimes for individ-
uals as well as add to the literature on neuroplasticity
in response to expert training.
We have attempted here to argue that well-consid-
ered behavioral methods combined with convergent
neuroimaging and other techniques can successfully
externalize the particularly covert process of musical
auditory imagery. This research allows us to gain insight
into one of the more inaccessible aspects of cognition,
and thereby provides us with valuable information con-
cerning the neural underpinnings of abstract mental
processes. Clinical or educational applications pertain-
ing to these highest levels of cognitive function will
emerge only to the extent that we can rigorously link
brain mechanisms to mental processes; we would ar-
gue that the future of cognitive neuroscience will de-
pend on expanding just this sort of knowledge.
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